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Abstract 
Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often 
develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This 
appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply 
communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that 
anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of 
cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of 
trust games with one-way communication and an emotion survey to investigate the role of 
emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate 
trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural 
distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their 
effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction 
outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of 
emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be 
trusted, and when trust will be re-extended. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we explore the role of positive emotions (pride, believability, appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, happiness) and negative emotions (guilt, shame, anger, disgust, 
aggravation, frustration) in regulating cheap signaling, trust re-extension, and trustworthy 
behavior in the wake of a veiled trust-based interaction between strangers with no explicit 
indication of certain expectation for repeated interaction.1 Interactions with strangers have 
presented recurrent adaptive problems over the course of human evolutionary history (Fehr & 
Henrich 2003) and are common in modern society, especially in global markets (Nowak & 
Sigmund 2005; Seabright 2010). Sometimes unexpected opportunities for repeated exchange 
with previously cooperative or uncooperative partners arise.2 Once exchange histories establish, 
partners with mutually beneficial non-binding agreements often reap gains from iterated trust-
based trade with one another (e.g., see Cochard, Nguyen Van & Willinger 2004; Boero et al. 
2009; Kaplan et al. 2012). However, investors ceding resources (in anticipation of desired 
                                                 
1 A number of other behavioral economic studies have also used veiled designs where interacting participants are 
unaware of opportunity for repeated interaction(s) that will later be made available (e.g., see Binmore, Shaked & 
Sutton 1985; Burnham, McCabe & Smith 2000; Ellingsen et al. 2010; Gambetta & Szekely 2014). Ellingson et al. 
(2010, p.96) discuss why the veiled design avoiding deception by commission does not violate the non-deception 
norm in behavioral economic experiments and why withholding procedural information may serve to limit 
undesirable experimenter demand. Nevertheless, because there is no clear agreement among economists as to what 
kinds of deception are taboo (see survey results by Krawczyk 2013 and discussion by Wilson 2014), deception by 
omission remains a potential concern with our design. Veiled designs may create negative externality in that the next 
time participants return to the laboratory to participate in other studies, they may question whether they should 
anticipate unannounced tasks or interactions, unless the instructions explicitly exclude such a possibility (see also 
Davis & Holt 1993, pp. 23‐24; Wilson 2014). It is unlikely that our design produced these externalities, however, as 
we followed the procedural norm for conducting research with our participant pool by specifying the expected 
session duration, making a clear statement about the experimental game which was the final one in the session, and 
indicating when payments would be issued. We discuss in the design section how future studies using veiled designs 
can make improvements over ours to avoid omitting important details – namely, whether subsequent tasks are 
scheduled as part of the session. 
2 While transactions with strangers may have been full of danger, mistrust, and exploitation for much of human 
evolutionary history (Diamond 1997; Bowles 1998), at least more recently, since the 19th century, as modern market 
society and per capita income have grown (Clark 2007), the norm of exchange has moved from more exclusively 
personal to more anonymous (North 1990). Market proliferation, in turn, has reinforced learning of the notion that 
trust in strangers brings benefits, resulting in greater trustworthiness (Zak & Knack 2001; Henrich et al. 2001, 2010; 
Al-Ubaydli et al. 2013). 
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returns) remain subject to various kinds of exploitation by previously trusted partners. Partners 
who demonstrated trustworthiness in the past might subsequently engage in Machiavellian 
manipulations (Humphrey 1976; Byrne & Whiten 1988) by sending false signals about intentions 
to engage in future trustworthy behavior. Upon being re-extended trust, these previously trusted 
partners can opportunistically exploit their positions.3 Alternatively, if a partner was previously 
untrustworthy (e.g., breaking a promise and not returning profits on investment) but claims to 
have intentions and propensity for future trustworthiness, an investor must decide whether to 
forgo potential gains from future trust-based exchange (by not re-extending trust) or else pursue 
the available opportunity with that previously untrustworthy partner, at the risk of being 
repeatedly deceived or exploited.4 While much attention has been given to the production and 
evaluation of cues and signals affecting novel trust extension, less attention has been given to the 
dilemma of trust re-extension and the role of emotions in regulating relevant behaviors. 
The ability to integrate evaluations of reputation from cues and signal quality, infer a 
partner’s propensity towards future trustworthiness, and accordingly regulate trust re-extension 
would have been a highly advantageous trait over the course of human evolutionary history and 
should continue to be in modern economies. Evolutionary theories of emotions (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1990; Nesse 1990; Haselton & Ketelaar 2006; Tooby et al. 2008; Schniter & Shields 
2013) have proposed that key emotions have been selected to assist us in accomplishing these 
tasks. We test the propositions that new information about trust-based interaction outcomes 
triggers emotions, and that, when experienced, these emotions regulate re-affirmative and 
remedial behaviors, and the propensity to re-extend trust.  
                                                 
3 McNally and Tanner (2011) speculated that under conditions of “an unforgiving Machiavellian society”, one-shot 
cooperation is most likely to evolve. 
4 As suggested by the phrase “…fool me twice, shame on me”, there may be stronger hedonic costs to being a 
targeted victim of repeated deception, than are experienced after being a first-time victim. 
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Consistent with “recalibrational” theories of emotions (Tooby et al. 2008; Schniter & 
Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2014), we propose that emotions integrate new 
information about trust-based interaction outcomes, providing hedonic feedback that people 
experience as either positively valenced (pleasantly motivating continuation of prior behaviors 
associated with its occurrence) or negatively valenced (unpleasantly motivating disengagement 
and pursuit of alternative strategies). This positive or negative emotional feedback is designed to 
motivate changes to behavioral propensities so as to enhance success in future relationships 
characterized by similar cooperation dilemmas. For example, when a trust-based relationship has 
been developed and assured, good feelings such as pride and appreciation are experienced 
(Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2014). As a result, proud trustees may 
be more inclined to re-affirm the good relationship and demonstrate more trustworthiness (e.g., 
see Nesse 1990; Fessler 1999, 2001), and appreciative or grateful investors may be more likely 
to trust the trustee’s cheap signals and re-extend trust (McCullough et al. 2001; Dunn & 
Schweitzer 2005; Algoe, Haidt & Gable 2008; Hirshleifer 1987; Tooby & Cosmides 2008). 
Alternatively, when a trustee has demonstrated untrustworthy behavior (breaking a promise or 
exploiting an investor) the investor may experience anger and frustration (e.g. see Ortony, Clore 
& Collins 1988; Dunn & Schweitzer 2005) while the trustee experiences guilt, and shame (e.g. 
see Ketelaar & Au 2003; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton 1994; Smith, Webster & Eyre 
2002; Sznycer 2010, Sznycer et al. 2012). Angry and frustrated investor’s may be more likely to 
distrust subsequent promises or offers from the untrustworthy trustee (e.g., see Dunn & 
Schweitzer 2005; Pillutla & Murnighan 1996), and more likely to impose costs or restrict 
benefits (e.g., see Sell, Tooby & Cosmides 2009). A guilty or shameful trustee  may be 
motivated to make remedial efforts (e.g., issuing a persuasive message or apology) targeting the 
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affected investor – especially when there is possibility of future trust-based exchange opportunity 
with this potentially angry investor (e.g. see de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans 2011; 
Fessler 2001; Sznycer 2010; Sznycer et al. 2012). Apology has been demonstrated to be a 
particularly effective remedial signal that encourages a victim to trust again by expressing 
responsibility for an offense and possibly the promise of forbearance, an offer of condolence, or 
repair (Scher & Darley 1997; Ho 2012; Fischbacher & Utikal 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & 
Sznycer 2013). 
To study the predictors of emotions and the effects of emotions on spontaneous 
messaging and trust re-extension, we conducted a non-deceptive study wherein financially 
motivated participants used endogenously created and naturally distributed promises and 
messages. Our study is based on a version of the “investment game” by Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe (1995). In our experiments trustees made non-binding promises of investment-
contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how 
much to return. Since investing money is risky, investments are usually interpreted as trust. 
Likewise, because voluntary returns are costly to trustees, the delivery of promised returns on 
investment (ROI) is interpreted as evidence of trustworthiness. We also administered a 20 item 
survey in which participants reported their emotional status as a consequence of the decisions 
and interaction outcomes that they just experienced.5 After an unexpected second game was 
announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design 
                                                 
5 In this study we focus on 12 emotions that had previously been shown to be affected by trust-based exchange 
outcomes (Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2014). However, to avoid demand effects that 
might result by focusing participants only on the 12 emotions of interest to our study, and to limit post-
rationalization that might result from inducing a more limited focus, we presented subjects with a larger number of 
20 emotions. This set of 20 emotions is frequently used in versions of the one-dimensional Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positively and negatively valenced affect state activations 
developed by Watson, Clark & Tellegen (1988) that has been demonstrated across large non-clinical samples to be a 
reliable and valid measure of these states (Crawford & Henry 2004). 
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allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant 
behaviors, consequent emotions, and focus on these emotions’ effects on trustees’ naturally 
occurring communication strategies, investors’ trust re-extension, and trustee’s trustworthiness.  
While results on the observed frequencies of game behaviors in both trust games of this 
study are reported in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Schniter, Sheremeta 
& Sznycer 2013), we did not previously examine the role of emotions. In this paper we evaluate 
reports of emotions and their role in regulating behaviors relevant to the dilemma of trust re-
extension. 
 
2. Background 
Despite normative predictions, trust is often developed in experimental one-shot 
environments with unrelated strangers (e.g., see Dawes & Thaler 1988; Kiyonari, Tanida & 
Yamagishi 2000; McCabe, Rigdon & Smith 2003; Krasnow et al. 2013), especially when 
facilitated by cheap talk and emotions (Gambetta & Székely; McElreath et al. 2003; Frank 1988, 
2004; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow 2006; Ben-Ner & Putterman 2009; Ben-Ner, Putterman & 
Ren 2011; Sheremeta & Zhang 2014). When taking into account the observation that people 
exist and have long existed under the uncertain but ever present shadow of possible future 
interactions with others, the propensity to trust (despite hazards for opportunism) may bring net 
exchange benefits.6 Under such conditions natural selection may have favored those with the 
propensity to cooperate even when exposed to indicators that interactions were one-shot and 
interaction partners were unknown (Delton et al. 2011; Krasnow et al. 2013). Sayings like “you 
always meet twice in a lifetime”, "you haven't seen the last of me", and “dangerous enemies will 
                                                 
6 Human psychological adaptations for sociality likely evolved under a selective regime characterized by repeated 
interactions among known others (Kelly 1995). 
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meet again in narrow streets” seem to provide justification for the human tendency to treat others 
as if they will be beneficial exchange partners or threats in the future, despite the absence of cues 
assuring there will be repeated interaction. The one-shot investment game (Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe 1995) that models the opportunity to develop and allocate gains through exchange, has 
shown time and again that people exposed to one-shot sequential exchange opportunities with 
anonymous others tend to behave in a mutually beneficial way (for reviews see Ostrom & 
Walker 2005; Balliet & Van Lange 2012) despite the normative proscription from game theory: 
do not cooperate because your partner will not cooperate.  
In the absence of information about past behavior, “cheap” messages (bearing little in the 
way of up-front costs for production) are often sent to receivers with the intention of 
communicating information about the sender (e.g., see Farrel & Rabin 1996). For example, non-
binding promises (of intended trustworthiness) have been shown to increase cooperation (Rubin 
& Brown 1975; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Ellingsen & Johannesson 2004; Charness & 
Dufwenberg 2006; Sutter 2009). Where demonstrated behavior has informed investors of a 
trustee’s untrustworthiness, messages may be sent with the intention of persuading investors that 
the trustee is more trustworthy than inferred from cues alone. Many find it quite puzzling that so-
called “cheap signals” can effectively be used to negotiate trust between individuals with 
conflicting interests (Lachmann, Számadó & Bergstrom 2001) and that it is even possible for 
promise-breakers to rebuild damaged trust by issuing apologies (Schniter, Sheremeta & Sznycer 
2013). Below we review why trust can be built with the help of cheap-to-produce messages and 
why those who re-extend trust to previously untrustworthy individuals (e.g., to promise breakers) 
may take their messages into consideration. 
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Cheap-to-produce messages can maintain their reliability because they often end up being 
“costly” after being used to deceive (Schniter, Sheremeta & Sznycer 2013). Through reputational 
sanctions or exclusion from future interactions, receivers of deceptively used cheap signals can 
impose ex post costs greater than the benefits initially derived from deceptively using those 
signals (Rohwer 1977; Masclet et al. 2003; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow 2006) – thereby 
maintaining signal reliability in the society in which it was used.  
Though it has been studied little, it is reasonable to expect that the psychological 
machinery designed to produce and evaluate cheap signals is attuned to the experience and 
perception of emotions. Emotions are important components of message composition, speech 
production and perception, and face-to-face communication. Personal communication in various 
forms is known to improve cooperation (Orbell, Dawes & Kragt van de 1988; Bohnet & Frey 
1999; Ridings, Gefen & Arinze 2002; Zheng et al. 2002; Buchan, Croson & Johnson 2006; 
Cason, Sheremeta & Zhang 2012) by facilitating coordination, decreasing social distance, raising 
solidarity, and providing the cues of familiarity that are normally associated with trustworthy 
relationships. Adam Smith (1759) wrote of the “fellow feeling” that can be generated, for 
example as a consequence of sharing in another’s emotional state, and being part of the process 
of improving it. According to Smith, the capacity to experience the pleasurable “fellow feeling” 
is based on our ability to model another’s circumstances and emotional reaction to them, and to 
internally simulate (sympathize with) the emotional feelings that they might derive. When 
messages are produced7, they are often assembled with verbiage meant to demonstrate regard for 
the recipient, persuade a change in the recipient’s perspectives, and provide information of the 
                                                 
7 Messaging is often an option (i.e., not compulsory). When optional, we expect people to tradeoff costs and 
benefits. Messaging may not be chosen for a variety of reasons including: to minimize cognitive effort, in an attempt 
to manage impressions, to save time, to pursue alternative opportunities that otherwise might be forgone. 
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signaler’s intentions and emotional experiences: things which may not be otherwise known 
(Pennebaker & Graybeal 2001). Though the messages we consider guarantee no honest 
information, their length is a potential indication of the effort invested into an attempt to 
communicate these potentially unknown things. On the other hand, where messages are intended 
as re-affirmations of known things (e.g., recent cooperation), their length is not as necessary. 
Thus to understand the human ecology of cheap signal production and evaluation, one should 
also understand the dynamic triggering of emotions and their targeted effects on the propensity to 
engage in communication.  
According to the recalibrational theory of emotions, when evolved psychological 
machinery has computationally identified adaptive problems resulting from social dilemma 
outcomes, emotional responses are triggered that encourage recalibration of behavior regulation 
programs (Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2014). As such, emotions are 
hedonic components of a learning system that integrates relevant experiences to inform 
individual decisions and interaction behaviors. Emotions are often relatively “automatic”, 
difficult to control, and distinct from cogitative non-emotional learning. When triggered, 
emotional responses produce sudden physiological changes (e.g., arousal) and affect facial 
expression, posture, subjective experience and perception, and action tendencies (Frijda 1986; 
Tooby & Cosmides 1990).  
Emotionally affected speech and facial expression have long been believed to have some 
“honest signal” features revealing underlying emotional states (Darwin 1872). A century after 
Darwin, researchers began making a strong case that basic human emotions are not only 
universal in their distinct facial and vocal expressions, but also that the identification of these 
emotions exists and is consistent across humans. Evidently, humans can accurately recognize 
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many basic emotions (e.g., happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, disgust and anger) across quite 
different cultures in faces (e.g., Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen 1969), voices (Bryant & Barrett 
2008; Sauter et al. 2010), and written messages (Xiao & Houser 2005) supporting the notion that 
these communicative forms provide fairly reliable indicators of the positive and negative affect, 
if not actual emotion, that the sender experiences (Keltner & Kring 1998) and that a reduction in 
ambiguity has been selected for in human emotional signaling (Searcy & Nowicki 2005). 
Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1988, 2004) proposed that emotions provide information about 
people’s behavior propensities (e.g. as guarantors of promises) because they work as 
commitment devices. As veridical signals, emotions appear to be sufficiently reliable in this 
capacity; emotional displays are more often than not involuntary and high levels of emotional 
expressivity are difficult to imitate (Boone & Buck 2003; Schug et al. 2010). Thus, the standard 
human ecology in which “cheap” signal production and evaluation was designed to operate is not 
entirely costless. Rather, because the signaling of emotional states is often veridical, language 
should be evaluated and trusted according to its correspondence with emotional propensities. 
Under these conditions, detection of deceptive language production would lead to the imposition 
of more costs than benefits on the signaler – effectively making cheaply produced language in 
the context of displayed emotions a “costly signal”.  
We anticipated that, despite the anonymity we guaranteed participants in our laboratory 
implementation of the trust game (i.e., ensuring that their partners would not personally identify 
or watch them), experiences of emotions would be reliably produced and recognized by those 
experiencing them.8 We evaluate the reported experience of several emotions (appreciation, 
                                                 
8 Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields (2014) also collected data on emotional reactions to trust-based interaction 
outcomes using an emotional status survey with multiple emotion items. They reported floor effects with some of 
their items: where participants indicated experiencing the emotion very little or not at all. However, other emotions 
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contentment, cheerfulness, happiness, pride, believability, anger, disgust, aggravation, 
frustration, guilt, and shame) and whether these emotions predict the use of cheaply produced 
messages, trust re-extension, and trustworthy or opportunistic behavior. Below we hypothesize 
that these emotions serve the recalibrational functions outlined in Schniter and Shields (2013), 
and detail specific predictions about the triggering of these emotions and how experienced 
emotions will correlate with subsequent behaviors. Previous studies have shown that the 
experience of emotions affects subsequent game behavior (Capra 2004; Pillutla & Murnigham 
1996; Fehr & Gachter 2002; Ketelaar & Au 2003; Dunn & Schweitzer 2005; Hopfensitz & 
Reuben 2009; Kausel & Connolly 2014). The current study contributes to this literature by 
examining how trust-relevant integral emotions are naturally triggered by interaction outcomes 
and how they inform trust repair and re-extension in subsequent interactions after trust is 
damaged.9 
 
3. Experiment Details and Hypotheses. 
3.1. Experiment Details 
Our research was approved by Chapman University’s internal review board for research 
with human subjects and informed consent was obtained from all participants. The research was 
                                                                                                                                                             
in their study showed strong responsiveness to trust-game outcomes, and based on those results they suggested that 
future researchers consider investigating appreciation, happiness, pride, frustration, anger, and guilt: a selected set 
with balanced valance that is representative of the varieties of functions described by their recalibration model of 
emotions in trust-based interaction. We chose to study those six emotions in addition to another six which we 
expected to be roughly synonymous and therefore similarly activated: cheerfulness (often concomitant with 
appreciation), contentment (often concomitant with happiness), believability (often concomitant with pride), 
aggravation (often concomitant with frustration), disgust (often concomitant with anger), and shame (concomitant 
with guilt when the offender’s culpability is known). 
9 A few neuroeconomic studies have shown evidence of neural correlates of interaction behaviors in ultimatum 
games (Sanfey et al. 2003) and trust games (Aimone, Houser & Weber 2014) that may correspond to emotional 
experiences (e.g., see Takahashi et al. 2004) but have not provided direct measures of whether emotions were 
actually experienced. Because physiological measures are often incapable of detecting social emotions (Adolphs 
2002), self-reports may provide the best, if not only, direct measures of social emotions (Hopfensitz & Reuben 
2009). 
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conducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. 458 participants (229 pairs) were recruited 
from a standard campus-wide subject pool for participation in a session that could last up to 45 
minutes. There were 25 sessions. Each session had between 10 and 24 participants. The average 
earnings from experiments were $18, ranging from a $0 to $40, plus $7 for arriving to the 
session on time and participating. No participant participated more than once, and no participant 
had prior experience with a similar game environment. During a session, participants seated at 
visually isolated cubicles interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer 
network. Our procedure consisting of three parts, lasted an average of 35 min total, did not 
involve deception,10 and proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, participants were told that they 
would receive $7 for participation, to be paid at the end of the session along with any additional 
money made during the session.  
In the first part of the session, participants received instructions (see Appendix A) for and 
interacted in an “experiment”: a veiled trust game with (i) no indication of a subsequent game to 
follow and (ii) no statements that the session would end at conclusion of that game. The first 
trust game is denoted as ‘veiled’ because participants are intentionally not informed of a 
subsequent “repetition of the experiment”: a trust game (repeated with same roles and partners as 
                                                 
10 Though we failed to provide information at the outset of our session indicating our intent to provide a repeated 
trust game opportunity, our procedure does not qualify as the more typical form of experimental deception (e.g. by 
commission of lies or exaggerations). In an effort to neither mislead nor coerce individuals, participants were made 
aware that their participation was voluntary and that they could stop participating at any time, we provided 
participants a reasonable indication of expected total duration for the session to which they were recruited, and we 
made no misleading or counterfactual statements. Nevertheless, future studies using similar veiled approaches can 
improve on our design by more explicitly clarifying from the outset that a multi-stage approach is planned. As 
suggested by the editor, a veiled design could avoid use of the word “experiment” in describing a single stage and 
more transparently explain to participants something like, “The session consists of three stages. You will receive 
now the instructions of stage 1. After completion of stage 1, there will be a stage 2 for which you then will receive a 
new set of instructions. Finally, following completion of stage 2 there will be a final stage 3 for which you will 
receive a new set of instructions.” 
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before) that would follow in part three.11 Participants were assigned to one of two roles: 
“Participant A” (investor), or “Participant B” (trustee). First, the trustee completed the following 
standardized statement (which we will refer to below as a promise) by selecting an integer from 
0 to 20: “I (Participant B) promise to transfer back $___of my income to you (Participant A) if 
you choose IN”. This statement was not binding, however. That is, the trustee was not obligated 
to transfer back the amount promised to the investor, and both trustee and investor knew this. 
The computer conveyed the trustee’s statement to the investor and then the investor chose either 
OUT or IN. If the investor chose OUT, she received $5 and the trustee $0. If the investor chose 
IN (invest), then the trustee received $20 (the “income”), after which he selected a whole dollar 
amount from $0 to $20 to send back to the investor.  
In the second part of the session, after the veiled trust game (game 1) finished, 
participants were given an emotional status survey (see Appendix B) that asked them to report 
how much they felt each of 20 emotional states (on a five point scale labeled (1) very slightly or 
not at all, (2) a little, (3) moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their 
recent game interactions and outcomes.12 The computer software presented all emotional states 
on one screen and in random order.  
In the third part of the session, after completing the survey, we gave our participants 
additional instructions (see Appendix A) indicating that they had opportunity to participate in a 
“repetition of the experiment”. These instructions unveiled that in game 2, participants would 
                                                 
11 We were motivated to see how people deal with trust re-extension dilemmas that were not explicitly anticipated as 
a consequence of certain expectations (for repeated interaction) but arise through a surprise unveiling. This required 
us to first examine trust-based interaction behaviors carried out by procedurally naïve individuals from behind the 
veil of ignorance.  
12 Of the 20 emotions surveyed, we later focus predictions and analyses on a positive subset (appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, happiness) and a negative subset (anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration) among 
investors (who might have been benefited or exploited and had their trust assured or damaged), and a positive subset 
(pride, believability) and a negative subset (guilt, shame) among trustees (who might have been beneficent or 
opportunist and kept or broken their promises). 
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remain in the same roles and interact with the same partner as in game 1. The instructions also 
indicated that prior to game 2, the trustee would have an opportunity to use a “message” box to 
send a one-way message to the investor. Trustees were told that “in these messages, no one is 
allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance,” but that other than 
these restrictions, trustees could “say anything in the message.” If trustees wished not to send a 
message they were instructed to “simply click on the send button without having typed anything 
in the message box.” The computer conveyed the trustee’s message and subsequently the 
standardized promise to the investor, and then game 2 proceeded. We specified that game 2, 
which had the same rules as game 1, was the last experimental game in the session.  
We classified whether messages from our study were apology (or not) using an 
incentivized laboratory coordination game (Houser & Xiao 2011). Three coders recruited from 
the subject pool and blind to the hypotheses13 were asked to code each message based on 
whether or not it conformed to a broad definition of apology (“an explicit or implicit 
acknowledgment of offense”). All messages without content were coded by all coders as not 
conforming to the definition of apology and 93% of messages with content were coded by the 
majority of coders as conforming to the definition, a “substantial” inter-coder agreement (Kappa 
of 0.70).14 
  
                                                 
13 The instructions for coders, details about how they were paid, and their earning from the incentivized task are 
reported in Schniter, Sheremeta, and Sznycer (2013). 
14 We use a standard approach from content analysis methodology to calculate Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater agreement 
coefficient (Cohen 1960; Krippendorff 2004). Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate” 
agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis & Koch 1977).  
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3.2. Hypotheses 
An earlier publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Schniter, 
Sheremeta & Sznycer 2013) detailed behavioral results from games 1 and 2 of this study, with 
particular attention to the effects of promises, transfers, messages, and apologies. This earlier 
publication did not examine the role of emotion experiences as a result of these games and gave 
less attention to the unanticipated dilemma of trust re-extension that we focus on here.   
When deciding whether to re-extend trust, it is important for an investor to obtain 
accurate information about the propensity of trustees to behave in a trustworthy manner. The 
integrity of a trustee’s previous promise (i.e., its signal value) and the actual returns made on 
investment (ROI) are verbal and non-verbal indicators, respectively, of trustworthy character 
(demonstrated in past word and action). Previous studies suggest that verbal and non-verbal 
indicators of trustworthiness may have separate effects on subsequent trust extension 
(Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow 2006; Schniter, Sheremeta & Sznycer 2013), so we examine 
them as independent variables. We hypothesize that these verbal and non-verbal demonstrations 
of trustworthy character trigger distinct sets of emotional reactions in investors and trustees 
facing particular problems and that the emotions better calibrate them for repeated interaction 
with one another. 
Specifically, we predict that when the signal value (= return – promise) of trustworthiness 
is negative, the trustee’s psychology implicitly recognizes potential for a subsequent promise 
breaker’s (promise keeper’s) cooperation problem and triggers an emotional reaction: lower 
(higher) levels of pride and believability, higher (lower) levels of guilt and shame. When the 
non-verbal indicator of trustworthiness, ROI (= return/investment), is greater (not greater) than 
one, the trustee implicitly recognizes potential for a subsequent beneficent (opportunist) 
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cooperation problem and an emotional reaction is triggered: feeling higher (lower) levels of pride 
and believability, lower (higher) levels of guilt and shame. We expect that together the trustee’s 
beneficent (opportunist) and promise breaker (promise keeper) emotional reactions inform the 
trustee’s propensity to produce spontaneous re-affirmative or remedial behaviors (constructing 
messages with content, constructing wordier messages with higher word count, and issuing 
spontaneous apologies) in preparation for a subsequent interaction problems. 
We predict that when the signal value (= return – promise) is negative (positive), the 
investor implicitly recognizes potential for a subsequent damaged trust (assured trust) 
cooperation problem and an emotional reaction is triggered, characterized by higher (lower) 
levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration, and lower (higher) levels of appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness. When ROI is greater than one (one or less), the 
investor experiences a benefited (exploited) emotional reaction: feeling lower (higher) levels of 
anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration, and higher (lower) levels of appreciation, contentment, 
cheerfulness, and happiness. 
We expect that the propensity to re-extend trust in game 2 is informed by the investor’s 
emotional reactions to demonstrated trustworthiness, and some assessment of re-affirmative and 
remedial messaging (e.g., whether or not there is a message with content, what the word count of 
message is, whether or not an apology was issued) by the trustee after the investor’s initial 
emotional reactions to game 1 interaction outcomes.15 In Figure 1 we provide a path model 
                                                 
15 We suspect that investor emotional reactions to trustee re-affirmative and remedial behaviors would also affect 
our model, however we did not survey emotional reactions to either received messages or game 2 promises and are 
therefore unable to account for their partial effects. Our model characterizes cooperation problems resulting from 
certain game interaction outcomes as discrete and binary (e.g. a promise is either kept or broken), and expects the set 
of recalibrational emotions they trigger to be distinct (promoting either re-assuring or remedial messaging, 
respectively). As such, we evaluate reports of emotional states and behavioral differences between naturally-formed 
groups (e.g. promise keeper vs. promise breaker trustees, beneficent vs. opportunist trustees, etc.) using two-sample 
(Welch’s) t-tests for equal means where appropriate. 
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visually representing the above predicted relationships between indicators of trustworthiness, 
emotional reactions to cooperation problems resulting from game 1 interaction outcomes, 
messaging behaviors, and the trust of re-extension decision. We suspect that investor emotional 
reactions to trustee re-affirmative and remedial behaviors would also affect our model, however 
we did not survey emotional reactions to either received messages or game 2 promises and are 
therefore unable to account for their partial effects. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
In addition to the predicted emotional effects on messaging and trust re-extension 
summarized above and in Figure 1, we predict emotional effects on trustee behavior in game 2. 
Specifically, we predict a greater propensity to generate trustworthy indicators (e.g., with higher 
signal value and higher ROI) in game 2 among trustees who reported higher levels of emotional 
reaction to game 1 – regardless of reaction valence (i.e., higher levels of feeling proud, 
believable, guilty, and ashamed). Conversely, we expect those reporting less emotional reaction 
to demonstrate less trustworthy behaviors. 
 
4. Results 
Trust and reciprocity decisions from this game are reported in detail in Schniter, 
Sheremeta & Sznycer (2013); however, the role of game outcomes in triggering emotional 
experiences, and the role of emotional experiences in affecting subsequent behavior propensity 
was not reported. 
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4.1. General Overview 
We found no significant differences between the twenty five sessions and report the joint 
results of all 458 participants where appropriate. As seen with similar games, we observed a high 
initial rate of promised cooperation: 95.2% (218/229) of trustees promised investors ROI > 1, 
3.9% (9/229) promised ROI = 1, and 0.8% (2/229) promised ROI < 1. In game 1, there was also 
a high rate of trust in response to the promises: investors trusted 86.7% (189/218) of trustees 
promising ROI > 1 and 22.2% (2/9) promising ROI = 1, but none of those promising ROI < 1. 
Trusting investors from the first game (83.4% of all investors) faced a new set of challenges 
when they interacted with the same trustees again in a second unexpected game. Some of these 
investors decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees who cooperated in the first game by 
delivering a ROI > 1 (which 88.5% did), delivering the returns they promised (which 81.2% did), 
or both. Other investors decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees that did not deliver the 
returns they promised (18.8% of all trusted trustees), or did not deliver a profitable ROI (11.5% 
of all trusted trustees), or both. A subset of those who decided whether to re-extend trust to non-
cooperators, appear to have also been influenced by their emotional reactions to game 1 and 
subsequent message and apology that were sometimes received. 
We examined emotional state reports from the 382 participants who had game 1 
interactions where trust was extended. We found moderately high reliability of internal 
consistency in their emotion reports: the Cronbach alpha coefficient is 0.889 for the 10 item 
Positive Affect Scale and 0.888 for the 10 item Negative Affect Scale of our 20 item survey, a 
version of the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988).16 There was substantial variability in 
                                                 
16 Moderately high reliability of internal consistency in PANAS similar to ours has been reported by Watson, Clark 
and Tellegen (1988) and others (e.g., Mehrabian 1998; Roesch 1998; Kausel & Connolly 2014). 
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individual reports of the 12 emotional states investigated below.17 The average reported 
emotional state had a mean of 2.21 (median = 1, SD = 1.04), near 2 (“a little”). Ratings on every 
emotional state ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). While the modal 
report for most (7/12) emotional states was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were also seen 
at 3 for believable and 4 for appreciative, content, cheerful, and happy. Reports of 1 were more 
frequent for emotional states in the negative set than for the positive set (1968/2292 versus 
400/2292, respectively), contributing to significantly lower intensity of reported negative states 
(M = 1.27, SD = 0.75) than positive states (M = 3.15, SD = 1.34) according to Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs tests (Z = -15.167, p < .001). This pattern of significantly lower reported negative 
states was observed in both investors (Z = -9.446, p < .001) and trustees (Z = -11.798, p < .001). 
In this paper, we focus on the explanatory power of the emotional reactions we predict 
based on recalibrational theory. Below we report results indicating the predictable and predictive 
nature of emotional reactions in this unexpectedly repeated interaction. Emotions help explain 
whether participants attempted to use cheap signaling reassuringly or remedially, whether 
investors decided to re-extend trust, and whether individuals were more likely to break promises 
or benefit their exchange partners. 
 
4.2. Predicted Emotions 
4.2.1. Trustees: Emotions Predicted by Behavior  
In this section we evaluate whether the positive and negative emotional reactions to game 
1, reported by naturally occurring groups of trustees and investors, were predicted by 
demonstrations of trustworthiness (signal value, ROI) after being trusted (i.e., invested in). As 
                                                 
17 We refer to reports of proud, believable, guilty, ashamed, angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, 
content, cheerful, and happy emotional states.  
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predicted, after game 1, promise breakers reported significantly higher levels of guilt and shame 
than promise keepers, and promise keepers reported significantly higher levels of pride and 
feeling believable than promise breakers. We provide bar charts of promise breaker’s and 
promise keeper’s emotions and report the details of Welch’s t-test comparisons for equal means 
in Appendix C.  
Also, consistent with our prediction of a beneficent (opportunist) emotional reaction in 
trustees, beneficent trustees delivering ROI > 1 in game 1 reported significantly higher levels of 
pride and feeling believable. Opportunist trustees reported significantly higher levels of guilt and 
shame. We provide bar charts of beneficent and opportunist trustees’ emotions and report the 
details of Welch’s t-test comparisons in Appendix C.  
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
Table 1: Regression of Trustees’ Emotions on Signal Value 
Dependent variable Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return-Promise 0.116*** 0.164*** -0.138*** -0.084*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.012) 
Constant 3.429*** 3.394*** 1.222*** 1.110*** 
 (0.105) (0.096) (0.055) (0.042) 
R-squared 0.070 0.151 0.280 0.193 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
Table 2: Regression of Trustees’ Emotions on ROI 
Dependent variable Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return/Investment 0.709*** 0.872*** -0.821*** -0.481*** 
 (0.185) (0.173) (0.097) (0.076) 
Constant 2.137*** 1.781*** 2.722*** 1.992*** 
 (0.319) (0.298) (0.167) (0.130) 
R-squared 0.072 0.119 0.275 0.176 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Figure 2 displays a bubble plot of trustee emotions and signal value (the difference 
between game 1 return and promise). Observations are plotted with bubbles, where the relative 
size indicates the proportion of observations at a given point. Table 1 reports results of linear 
regression models where the dependent variable is a specific emotion (proud, believable, guilty, 
ashamed) and the independent variable is signal value. We find that trustee emotions are 
predicted by signal value of the promise. 
Similarly, Figure 3 displays a bubble plot of trustee emotions and ROI. Table 2 reports 
results of estimating linear regression models where the dependent variable is a specific emotion 
(proud, believable, guilty, ashamed) and the independent variable is ROI. We find that trustee 
emotions are predicted by ROI. This leads us to our first result: 
Result 1: Trustees’ demonstrations of trustworthiness in game 1, by signal value of 
promise and ROI, predict their subsequent emotions. 
 
4.2.2. Investors: Emotions Predicted by Behavior  
As predicted, investors with damaged trust (where game 1 return < promise) reported 
significantly higher levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, and frustration while investors who had 
been assured with a return ≥ promise reported significantly higher levels of appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness. We provide bar charts of emotions reported by 
investors with damaged trust and assured trust and report the details of Welch’s t-test 
comparisons in Appendix C.  
Also, consistent with our prediction, significantly lower levels of anger, disgust, 
aggravation, frustration, and significantly higher levels of appreciation, contentment, 
cheerfulness, and happiness were reported after game 1 by investors who had benefited from a 
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ROI > 1, as opposed to those exploited by lower ROI. We provide bar charts of emotions 
reported by investors who had benefited and been exploited and report the details of Welch’s t-
test comparisons in Appendix C.  
--- Figure 4 about here --- 
Table 3: Regression of Investors’ Emotions on Signal Value 
Dependent variable Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Game 1 Return-Promise -0.232*** -0.188*** -0.208*** -0.193*** 0.227*** 0.209*** 0.181*** 0.202*** 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 1.372*** 1.212*** 1.290*** 1.338*** 3.455*** 3.550*** 3.031*** 3.296*** 
 (0.066) (0.057) (0.063) (0.063) (0.098) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) 
R-squared 0.432 0.397 0.400 0.365 0.248 0.263 0.200 0.244 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
--- Figure 5 about here --- 
Table 4: Regression of Investors’ Emotions on ROI 
Dependent variable Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Game 1 Return/Investment -1.508*** -1.171*** -1.346*** -1.324*** 1.615*** 1.497*** 1.366*** 1.422*** 
 (0.109) (0.099) (0.105) (0.101) (0.161) (0.142) (0.147) (0.146) 
Constant 4.104*** 3.341*** 3.728*** 3.724*** 0.553** 0.863*** 0.590** 0.738*** 
 (0.187) (0.170) (0.181) (0.174) (0.278) (0.244) (0.254) (0.251) 
R-squared 0.505 0.425 0.464 0.477 0.346 0.371 0.313 0.334 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported. 
 
Figure 4 displays a bubble plot of investor emotions and signal value of promise. 
Observations are plotted with bubbles, where the relative size indicates the proportion of 
observations at a given point. Table 1 reports results of estimating linear regression models 
where the dependent variable is a specific emotion (angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, 
appreciative, content, cheerful, happy) and the independent variable is signal value. We find that 
investor emotions are predicted by signal value of promise. 
Similarly, Figure 5 displays a bubble plot of investor emotions and ROI. Table 4 reports 
results of estimating linear regression models where the dependent variable is a specific emotion 
(angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, content, cheerful, happy) and the 
Schniter & Sheremeta   Predictable and Predictive Emotions 
 
                     22 
independent variable is ROI. We find that investor emotions are predicted by ROI. This leads us 
to our second result: 
Result 2: Trustees’ demonstrations of trustworthiness in game 1, by signal value of 
promise and ROI, predict investors’ subsequent emotions. 
 
4.3. Predictive Emotions 
4.3.1. Trustees: Spontaneous Messaging Behaviors Predicted by Emotions  
Using regression analysis, we evaluated the effects of trustees’ emotional reactions to 
game 1 on measures of their spontaneous re-affirmative and remedial behaviors (sending a 
message with content, the word count sent, and inclusion of a spontaneous apology). Table 5 
reports how the likelihood of message (i.e., whether or not they sent a message with content) 
depends on different emotions. We also controlled for the trustee signal value, as a broken 
promise may have been a prime motivator for sending messages with content. Nevertheless, 
trustees’ feelings of pride showed a significant positive relationship predicting message (p = 
.027), explaining 2.7% of variance in message. Trustees feeling believable, guilt, or ashamed 
were not predictive of message. 
Table 5: Regression of Message on Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Message Message Message Message Message 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud 0.300**    0.330** 
 (0.136)    (0.146) 
Believable  0.184   0.120 
  (0.147)   (0.156) 
Guilty   0.344  0.562 
   (0.310)  (0.429) 
Ashamed    0.291 0.029 
    (0.402) (0.539) 
Game 1 Return-Promise -0.052 -0.046 0.028 0.006 0.003 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066) (0.076) 
Constant 0.429 0.800 1.002** 1.090** -0.761 
 (0.465) (0.513) (0.405) (0.474) (0.845) 
R-squared 0.027 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.047 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 6 reports how the message word count depends on different emotions, as well as 
the trustee signal value. We used a hurdle model, described by Cameron and Trivedi (1998), 
since the process of generating zero values (i.e., no words) is likely to be different from the 
process of generating positive values. Trustees’ pride showed a significant negative relationship 
(p < .001), while feeling believable as well as feelings of guilt and shame showed a significant 
positive relationship (p = .010, p < .001 and p < .001), with word count. Next, we estimated a 
regression to evaluate the combined effects of the above four emotional reactions on message 
word count. We can reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 6) have 
no effect on word count (Χ2 = 62.20, p < .001, df = 4). As a set, the four emotions predicted 5.5% 
of the variance in message word count. 
Table 6: Regression of Word Count on Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud -0.046***    -0.040** 
 (0.015)    (0.017) 
Believable  0.042**   0.081*** 
  (0.016)   (0.017) 
Guilty   0.160***  0.206*** 
   (0.024)  (0.036) 
Ashamed    0.132*** -0.064 
    (0.031) (0.045) 
Game 1 Return-Promise -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.016** -0.028*** -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 2.881*** 2.575*** 2.514*** 2.569*** 2.386*** 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.038) (0.042) (0.093) 
R-squared 0.029 0.027 0.044 0.032 0.055 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Next, Table 7 reports logistic regression analyses evaluating the effects of trustee 
emotional reactions to game 1 on spontaneous apology. Trustees’ feelings of pride did not show 
a significant relationship predicting apology. On the other hand, trustees feeling believable 
showed a significant negative relationship (p = .019) while feelings of guilt and shame showed a 
significant positive relationship (p = .000 and p = .005) predicting apology. Next, we estimated a 
logit model to evaluate the combined effects of the above four emotional reactions on likelihood 
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of apology. We can reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 7) have 
no effect on the likelihood of apology (Χ2 = 19.56, p < .001, df = 4). The Cox & Snell R2 
indicates that together the four emotions explain 41.8% of the apology variance. 
Result 3: Trustees’ emotions’ predict their subsequent messaging behavior such as 
issuing messages with content, with longer word count, and with apology. 
Table 7: Regression of Apology on Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Apology Apology Apology Apology Apology 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud -0.243    0.162 
 (0.169)    (0.227) 
Believable  -0.437**   -0.342 
  (0.187)   (0.235) 
Guilty   1.283***  1.371*** 
   (0.293)  (0.420) 
Ashamed    1.081*** -0.193 
    (0.389) (0.493) 
Game 1 Return-Promise -0.407*** -0.366*** -0.291*** -0.346*** -0.262*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.080) (0.085) 
Constant -1.535*** -0.973* -4.131*** -3.576*** -3.486*** 
 (0.576) (0.589) (0.544) (0.551) (1.119) 
R-squared 0.292 0.312 0.405 0.328 0.418 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: * significant at 10%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
4.3.2. Investors: Trust Re-extension Predicted by Emotions  
In this section we evaluate whether investors’ trust re-extension in game 2 was predicted 
by their emotional reactions to game 1 and by measures of spontaneous re-affirmative or 
remedial messaging behavior demonstrated after game 1. 
Table 8 reports logistic regression analyses evaluating the effects of trustee emotional 
reactions to game 1 on trust re-extension in game 2. We also include one of several measures of 
messaging behaviors (i.e., message, word count, or apology) that investors were targeted by, as 
well as the trustee signal value from game 1 and new promises (specifically, the returned amount 
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promised) in game 2. In estimating these models, we do not consider a model with multiple 
measures of messaging behaviors because it would introduce multicollinearity.18  
Table 8: Regression of Trust Re-Extension on Investors’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Game 2 Investment 
Game 2 
Investment 
Game 2 
Investment 
Game 2 
Investment 
Game 2 
Investment 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Angry -0.068 -0.113 0.038 0.004 -0.095 
 (0.325) (0.352) (0.380) (0.368) (0.342) 
Disgusted -0.062 -0.002 -0.308 -0.380 -0.230 
 (0.360) (0.386) (0.415) (0.441) (0.418) 
Aggravated 0.467 0.709 0.899 0.578 0.507 
 (0.516) (0.566) (0.599) (0.566) (0.562) 
Frustrated -0.858* -0.929* -0.934* -0.695 -0.829* 
 (0.471) (0.490) (0.516) (0.491) (0.504) 
Appreciative 0.041 -0.094 -0.077 -0.015 -0.057 
 (0.307) (0.333) (0.347) (0.328) (0.339) 
Content -0.101 -0.088 -0.034 -0.038 -0.016 
 (0.321) (0.327) (0.353) (0.335) (0.344) 
Cheerful 0.570 0.526 0.491 0.480 0.545 
 (0.375) (0.382) (0.403) (0.385) (0.395) 
Happy 0.013 0.072 0.095 -0.025 -0.019 
 (0.416) (0.431) (0.436) (0.439) (0.432) 
Game 1 Return-Promise  0.157* 0.202** 0.165 0.268* 
  (0.094) (0.100) (0.103) (0.138) 
Game 2 Promise  0.171 0.186 0.155 0.198 
  (0.118) (0.122) (0.121) (0.126) 
Message   1.994***   
   (0.589)   
Word count    0.053**  
    (0.026)  
Apology     2.635** 
     (1.182) 
Constant 1.795 0.386 -1.319 0.167 0.237 
 (1.230) (1.584) (1.748) (1.664) (1.714) 
R-squared 0.178 0.203 0.288 0.239 0.255 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
We can reject the hypothesis that all eight emotions in specification (1) of Table 8 have 
no effect on the likelihood of trust re-extension (Χ2 = 21.54, p = .005, df = 8, Cox Snell R2 = 
0.178). Overall, it appears that the most important emotion predicting trust re-extension is the 
experience of frustration. Specification (2) of Table 8 considers these emotions, as well as the 
trustee game 1 signal value and new promises in game 2 to predict trust re-extension (Χ2 = 24.06, 
p = .007, df = 10, Cox Snell R2 = 0.203). The change in R2 between specification (2) and 
                                                 
18 Message, word count, and apology are inter-related: whether or not there is a message (with content) is related to 
word count; whether or not there is apology is related to word count and to message. 
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specification (1) indicates that signal value and new promises explain an additional 2.5% of the 
variance. Specification (3) of Table 8 additionally considers message to predict trust re-extension 
(Χ2 = 27.43, p = .004, df = 11, Cox Snell R2 = 0.288). The change in R2 between specification (3) 
and specification (2) indicates that message explains an additional 8.5% of the variance. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn for specification (4) and specification (5). 
Result 4: Investors’ emotions, trustees’ messaging targeting investors, and promised 
returns in both games predict subsequent game 2 trust re-extension. 
 
4.3.3. Trustees: Signal Value and ROI in Game 2 Predicted by Emotions 
In this section we evaluate whether trustees’ emotional reactions to game 1 are predictive 
of game 2 demonstrations of trustworthiness (signal value and ROI in game 2).  
For previously trusted trustees who were re-extended trust again in game 2, we estimated 
linear regression models, reported in Table 9a and Table 9b, where the dependent variable is the 
signal value of game 2 promise (the difference between game 2 return and promise) and the 
independent variables are the trustee emotional reactions to game 1 (pride, believability, guilt, 
shame), as well as the signal value in game 1 (to control for individual effects). Table 9a uses a 
sub-sample of game 1 promise keepers and Table 9b uses a sub-sample of game 1 promise 
breakers. There are two interesting results that emerge from comparing these two tables. First, 
the signal value in game 1 and the signal value in game 2 are positively correlated for promise 
breakers (Table 9a) and negatively correlated for promise keepers (Table 9b). Second, it appears 
that emotions play a more important role in regulating the subsequent behavior of promise 
keepers than promise breakers. Table 9b shows that trustees feelings of pride in game 1 is 
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positively correlated with signal value in game 2, trustees feelings of shame is negatively 
correlated with signal value in game 2. 
Table 9a: Regression of Game 2 Signal Value on Promise Breaking Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Game 2 Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return-Promise 0.716*** 0.727*** 0.766*** 0.757*** 
 (0.210) (0.207) (0.211) (0.216) 
Proud -0.609    
 (0.745)    
Believable  -1.089   
  (0.857)   
Guilty   0.943  
   (0.807)  
Ashamed    0.734 
    (0.974) 
Constant -1.19 -0.527 -4.580* -3.647 
 (2.301) (2.242) (2.371) (2.192) 
R-squared 0.274 0.294 0.289 0.272 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 9b: Regression of Game 2 Signal Value on Promise Keeping Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Game 2 Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Game 2 
Return-Promise 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return-Promise -0.863** -0.887** -0.774* -0.562 
 (0.415) (0.417) (0.441) (0.460) 
Proud 0.368*    
 (0.208)    
Believable  0.244   
  (0.233)   
Guilty   -0.590  
   (0.657)  
Ashamed    -1.507* 
    (0.884) 
Constant -2.745*** -2.303*** -0.786 0.131 
 (0.787) (0.871) (0.779) (0.962) 
R-squared 0.049 0.037 0.035 0.048 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Next, we estimated linear regression models, reported in Table 10a and Table 10b, where 
the dependent variable is game 2 ROI (game 2 return divided by investment) and the independent 
variables are the trustee emotional reactions to game 1, as well as game 1 ROI (to control for 
individual effects). Table 10a uses a sub-sample of game 1 promise keepers and Table 10b uses a 
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sub-sample of game 1 promise breakers. The only significant emotion predicting ROI is shame 
experienced by promise keepers (Table 10b). 
Result 5: Trustees’ emotions predict their subsequent demonstrations of trustworthiness 
such as signal value and ROI in game 2. 
Table 10a: Regression of Game 2 ROI on Promise Breaking Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Game 2 Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return-Promise 0.720*** 0.699*** 0.760*** 0.759*** 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.237) (0.238) 
Proud -0.057    
 (0.126)    
Believable  -0.119   
  (0.148)   
Guilty   0.102  
   (0.138)  
Ashamed    0.107 
    (0.165) 
Constant 0.519 0.624 0.105 0.162 
 (0.387) (0.387) (0.461) (0.433) 
R-squared 0.230 0.241 0.238 0.235 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 10b: Regression of Game 2 ROI on Promise Keeping Trustees’ Emotions 
Dependent variable Game 2 Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Game 2 
Return/Investment 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Game 1 Return-Promise 0.611*** 0.627*** 0.618*** 0.681*** 
 (0.225) (0.226) (0.225) (0.223) 
Proud 0.070    
 (0.045)    
Believable  0.024   
  (0.050)   
Guilty   -0.208  
   (0.133)  
Ashamed    -0.420** 
    (0.169) 
Constant 0.232 0.365 0.701 0.797* 
 (0.433) (0.444) (0.445) (0.432) 
R-squared 0.064 0.050 0.064 0.086 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
5. Discussion 
Emotional experiences reported by our participants explain as much as 30.1% of their 
subsequent behavior. That the studied emotions did not predict more of the observed variance in 
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messaging or trust re-extension may be a consequence of the unexplained variance in reported 
experiences of emotions. Our model based on game 1 antecedents explained between 20% and 
47% of the variance in reports of each of the twelve emotional states studied, with more variance 
explained for the negative emotion states that were generally experienced with lower intensity. 
Below we consider whether some of the variance in emotional reports might be explained by 
differing interpretations of the emotion labels, design limitations of the survey instrument, or 
deliberately compromised reporting fidelity. 
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their 
emotional states (Ellsworth & Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and accurately 
described with multiple words (Izard 1977), or with different words among different people. 
While we acknowledge that language could present problems for this research and have no 
controls, the success of previous research on self-reported emotions in conjunction with 
experimental games (Ketelaar & Au 2003; Hopfensitz & Reuben 2009) gave us encouragement 
in using our instrument to pursue measures of self-reported emotions following an economic 
game.  
Data quality could also have been affected if our stimulus primed participants to 
experience specific emotions (e.g., as a consequence of experimenter demand) or if they were 
incentivized to make untruthful reports. Demand effects to provide inflated reports of the 
emotional states specifically studied in this report is unlikely because we surveyed a larger set of 
twenty emotional states and did not reveal the subset of emotional states that we were 
particularly interested in analyzing. Another concern is that if participants did not view the 
emotion survey as “incentive compatible”, they may have been motivated to answer untruthfully. 
A meta-review by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concludes that there is no clear evidence that 
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additional financial incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task 
like ours. In fact, for short tasks like these surveys that people are known to voluntarily complete 
without problem (because they have sufficient intrinsic motivation to do so), an attempt at 
increasing participation via financial incentives often “backfires” with counter-intentional effects 
(e.g., Mellstrom & Johannesson 2008). Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants 
may have been incentivized to use efficiency tactics to expediently complete the survey (such as 
by quickly marking all responses the same), we reviewed our data and found no cases of such 
behavior. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we examined how participants who were given no indication of opportunity 
for subsequent interactions, experienced emotions after participating in a trust game, and how 
such emotions influenced subsequent behaviors when another opportunity for trust-based 
exchange unexpectedly arose. We found that emotions triggered by trust-based interaction 
outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent messaging, apology, trust re-extension, and 
demonstrated trustworthiness. These findings advance our understanding of human behavior and 
they contribute to several areas of research. 
First, our study provides support for the recalibrational theory of emotions. According to 
this theory, new information about outcomes triggers emotions, and, when experienced, these 
emotions recalibrate the system regulating one’s propensity for subsequent behavior. In support 
of this theory, we find that positive emotions experienced after successful trust-based interaction 
motivate the investor to trust the trustee’s cheap signals and re-extend trust, and motivate the 
beneficent, promise keeper trustees to issue shorter re-affirmative messages (word count M=6.33, 
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SD = 10.970)19 and demonstrate more trustworthiness. Alternatively, a trustee’s negative 
emotional reaction to acting untrustworthy (breaking a promise and exploiting the investor), 
motivates remedial efforts like longer messages (word count M= 19.06, SD = 19.031) and 
apology targeting the affected investor. 
Second, our study provides an explanation for why “cheap-talk” (i.e., communication not 
necessarily affecting incentives, Farrell & Rabin 1996) is produced despite normative prediction, 
and why these kinds of messages are often effective. Though cheap-to-produce signals are not 
guaranteed to be reliable on their own and thus unexpected to persuade receivers (Zahavi 1993; 
Grafen 1990), they are frequently used by humans in the form of spoken or written words to 
negotiate trust between individuals with conflicting interests (Lachmann, Számadó & Bergstrom 
2001). Our study suggests that cheap-to-produce messages are reliable because they are 
influence by predictable emotions in reliable ways. For example, we find that the predicted 
positive emotional responses by trustees decrease the likelihood of apology and the length of 
message. On the other hand, predicted negative emotional responses increase the likelihood of 
apology and the length of message. Not only do emotions predict the use of cheap-to-produce re-
affirmative and remedial messages, but they also predict the subsequent behavior of trustees. In 
principal, investors who anticipate or have access to the dynamics of these emotional responses 
                                                 
19 Space precludes a full content analysis, but cursory inspection reveals that these messages tend to be re-
affirmative – calling attention to the successful exchange and intention to repeat it. Examples include “teamwork!”, 
“same deal.”, “same as last time :)”, “we’re a good pair. I don’t know what else to say haha.”, “same thing?”, “lets 
do this!”, “Pleasure doing business with you”, “I will keep it equal like last time”, “Let’s just do the same transfer 
again”, “Let’s do the same… It worked and we both made some money!!!”, “Same deal as before sounds about 
right, in my opinion”, “Let’s do the same thing, that way we both get the max amount of money”, “Same thing 
again. We both benefit.”, “I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us and it’s fair :) Thanks 
for being great!”, “Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶ and do the same thing.”, “well we worked together so far- 
want to do it again? at least we’ll both make more than $5”. Interested readers are encouraged to further examine the 
message content in Appendix D. 
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and communicative intentions should be able to reliably predict the behavior of trustees based on 
their messages.  
Finally, our study shows that remedial behaviors (spontaneous messaging with apology) 
can facilitate the rebuilding of damaged trust, with emotions guiding behavioral propensities. 
This is an important finding, given that breaches of trust are a common problem in social and 
economic relationships, and corporate life (Robinson & Rousseau 1994; Barnett 2003). 
For the past couple millennia scholars have recognized that emotions indeed matter in our 
everyday lives, but have argued over issues of whether and how emotions guide behavior. Much 
progress has been made towards understanding how emotions are triggered, and what their 
effects are on behavior, yet perhaps because of previous confusion or disagreement, the 
experimental study of emotions in behavioral economics and interpersonal relationships is still a 
frontier open for exploration. This study provides evidence that trust-based interaction outcomes 
trigger emotions in predictable ways that, in turn, influence our propensity towards subsequent 
behaviors. By triangulating with more objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral 
measures of emotional states some of the limitations of itemized self-reports could potentially be 
overcome. We see this as a fruitful avenue for future research  
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Figure 1: Path Model of Predicted Relationship between Variables 
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Figure 2: Bubble Plots of Trustees’ Emotions and Signal Value 
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Figure 3: Bubble Plots of Trustees’ Emotions and ROI 
(A) (B)  
(C) (D)  
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Figure 4: Bubble Plots of Investors’ Emotions and Signal Value 
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Figure 5: Bubble Plots of Investors’ Emotions and ROI 
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Appendix A: Instructions  
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not 
speak to other participants during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also 
receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.  
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the identity 
of the person with whom he or she is paired. 
 
DECISION TASKS 
 
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money you 
earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. 
First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicates the proportion of a possible $20 income that he 
or she promises to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. Specifically, B will complete the following statement: “I 
(Participant B) promise to transfer back ___ of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. The computer 
will convey B’s statement to A, and then A and B will proceed as described below. B may still choose an amount to 
transfer back to A that is different than the amount promised. 
Having received a statement from B, A indicates whether he or she chooses IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A 
receives $5 and B receives $0. If A chooses IN, then B receives $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 
income, B must choose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to transfer back to A.   
 
SURVEY 
 
After having completed the decision tasks described above you will be asked to fill out a short 20 item survey. 
 
DIAGRAM 
 
The following diagram represents how the experiment proceeds:  
 
    
B makes a promise: 
“I (Person B) promise to transfer back 
___ of my income to you (Person A) if 
you choose IN” 
A chooses: IN or OUT 
IN OUT 
promise 
B chooses: the amount ($X) from $0 
to $20 to transfer back to A. 
amount X 
A’s Earnings: $5 
B’s Earnings: $0 
A’s Earnings: $X 
B’s Earnings: $20-$X 
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(This part of the instructions was handed out after the first “experiment” was conducted.) 
 
REPETITION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the same 
A or B roles and paired with the same participants as in the previous tasks. 
 
MESSAGE 
 
Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text box 
to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B’s message has 
been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer to 
the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is 
allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed 
anything in the message box. 
 
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE) 
 
This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment. There 
will be no further tasks. 
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Appendix B: 20-item Emotion Survey 
 
 
  
Schniter & Sheremeta   Predictable and Predictive Emotions 
 
                     47 
Appendix C: Comparisons of Emotions between Trustees and between Investors 
Here we provide bar charts of trustees’ and investors’ emotions and report the details of 
Welch’s t-test comparisons between different groups of trustees (i.e., promise breaker vs. 
promise keeper, opportunist vs. beneficent) and investors (i.e. damaged vs. assured, exploited vs. 
benefited). These groups are hypothesized to have encountered distinct cooperation problems 
resulting from certain game interaction outcomes and we classify them accordingly. Trustees are 
classified into the following groups: promise breakers when game 1 return – game 1 promise < 
0, promise keepers when game 1 return – game 1 promise ≥ 0, opportunists when game 1 return / 
game 1 investment  ≤ 1, and beneficent when game 1 return / game 1 investment  > 1. Investors 
are classified into the following groups: those with damaged trust when game 1 return – game 1 
promise < 0, those with assured trust when game 1 return – game 1 promise ≥ 0, those who were 
exploited when game 1 return / game 1 investment  ≤ 1, and those who benefited when game 1 
return / game 1 investment  > 1. 
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Figure C1: Bar graphs Promise Breaker and Promise Keeper Trustee Emotions  
 
  
 
There was a significant difference (t(189) = -5.291, p < .001) in reports of pride between 
promise keepers M = 3.54 (SD = 1.330) and promise breakers M = 2.25 (SD = 1.273), a 
significant difference (t(189) = -7.969, p < .001) in reports of feeling believable between promise 
keepers M = 3.54 (SD = 1.191) and promise breakers M =1.81 (SD = 1.091), a significant 
difference (t(189) = -11.238, p < .001) in reports of guilt between promise keepers M = 1.12 (SD 
= 0.446) and promise breakers M = 2.47 (SD = 1.183), and a significant difference (t(189) = -
7.878, p < .001) in reports of shame between promise keepers M = 1.06 (SD = 0.346), and 
promise breakers M = 1.83 (SD = 1.000). 
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Figure C2: Bar graphs Opportunist and Beneficent Trustee Emotions  
   
 
There was a significant difference (t(189) = -6.965, p < .001) between reports of pride by 
beneficent M = 3.43 (SD = 1.370) and opportunist trustees M = 2.00 (SD = 1.340), a significant 
difference (t(189) = -6.203, p < .001) between reports of feeling believable by beneficent M = 
3.38 (SD = 1.282) and opportunist trustees M = 2.18 (SD = 1.308), a significant difference 
(t(189) = 4.316, p < .001) between reports of guilt by beneficent M = 1.21 (SD = 0.599) and 
opportunist trustees M =1.73 (SD = 1.205), and a significant difference (t(189) = 5.833, p < 
.001) between reports of shame by beneficent M = 1.09 (SD = 0.391) and opportunist trustees M 
=1.63 (SD = 1.025). 
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Figure C3: Bar graphs of Emotions for Investors who had Trust Damaged and Assured 
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Among negative emotion experiences there were significant differences (t(189) = -
12.644, p < .001) in reports of anger between investors with assured trust M = 1.26 (SD = 0.625) 
and damaged trust M = 3.22 (SD = 1.436), significant differences (t(189) = -10.645, p < .001) in 
reports of disgust between investors with assured trust M = 1.14 (SD = 0.476) and damaged 
trust M = 2.64 (SD = 1.457), significant differences (t(189) = -11.009, p < .001) in reports of 
aggravation between investors with assured trust M = 1.21 (SD = 0.589) and damaged trust M = 
2.89 (SD = 1.469), and significant differences (t(189) = -10.051) in reports of frustration from 
investors with assured trust M = 1.26 (SD = 0.615) and damaged trust M = 2.81 (SD = 1.431). 
Among positive emotion experiences there were significant differences (t(189) = 9.071 , p < 
.001) in reports of appreciation between investors with assured trust M = 3.59 (SD = 1.283) and 
damaged trust M = 1.53 (SD = 0.941), significant differences (t(189) = 8.476, p < .001) in 
reports of contentment between investors with assured trust M =3.65 (SD = 1.103) and damaged 
trust M =1.89 (SD = 1.190), significant differences (t(189) = 6.937, p < .001) in reports of 
cheerfulness between investors with assured trust M =3.11 (SD = 1.193) and damaged trust M = 
1.61 (SD = 1.050), and significant differences (t(189) = 8.491; p < .001) in reports of happiness 
between investors with assured trust M =3.40 (SD = 1.149) and damaged trust M =1.64 (SD = 
0.990). 
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Figure C4: Bar graphs of Emotions for Exploited and Benefited Investors 
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Among negative emotion experiences there were significant differences (t(189) = 12.337, 
p < .001) in reports of anger between investors who had benefited M = 1.36 (SD = 0.775) and 
been exploited M = 3.73 (SD = 1.279), significant differences (t(189) = 12.763, p < .001) in 
reports of disgust between investors who had benefited M = 1.193 (SD = 0.577) and been 
exploited M = 3.23 (SD = 1.343) ), significant differences (t(189) = 12.138, p < .001) in reports 
of aggravation between investors who had benefited M = 1.27 (SD = 0.67) and been exploited M 
= 3.45 (SD = 1.438), and significant differences (t(189) = 11.920, p < .001) in reports of 
frustration between investors who had benefited M = 1.31 (SD = 0.647) and been exploited M = 
3.41 (SD = 1.436). Among positive emotion experiences there were significant differences 
(t(189) = -7.426, p < .001) in reports of appreciation between investors who had benefited M 
=3.45 (SD = 1.336) and been exploited M = 1.27 (SD = 0.883), significant differences (t(189) = -
7.940, p < .001) in reports of contentment between investors who had benefited M = 3.55 (SD = 
1.165) and been exploited M = 1.50 (SD = 0.913), significant differences (t(189) = -6.568, p < 
.001) in reports of cheerfulness between investors who had benefited M = 3.03 (SD = 1.222) and 
been exploited M = 1.27 (SD = 0.767), and significant differences (t(189) = -7.304, p < .001) in 
reports of happiness between investors who had benefited M = 3.29 (SD = 1.202) and been 
exploited M = 1.36 (SD = 0.790). 
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Appendix D: Promises and Messages 
Table D1: Promise-Breakers Messages 
Promised 
Game 1 
Returned 
Game 1 
Message  Word-
count 
Broad 
Apology 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
15 0 Let's split even. $10 and $10. 6 YES 10 YES 8 
10 1 
 
 
 
 
If I knew there were 2 rounds I would have split it 
up even the first round.  This round I'll make it up 
to you by giving you 15 if you're IN, this way we 
both end up with more money.  Sorry again. 
43 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
3 
10 0 
 
 
Hey im sorry about that I didn't realize there was 
going to be another round.! Let me make things 
right. 
20 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
5 
10 9 i'll do the same deal as last time, sound fair? 10 NO 15 YES 9 
10 7 to even out i will give you 13 and i will take 7 13 YES 13 YES 10 
10 0 
 
 
 
 
dooooooood we all here to make muney baby so 
why dont we just split this huney down da middle,  
a lil lovin for da both of us? ill forrealze give you 
like 10 bucks and ill keep 10 you dig? stay fresh ;) 
43 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
YES 0 
10 7 How much would you want this time seeing how 
you didn't have a choice last time? I'm willing to 
make it even between the two of us. 
27 YES 13 YES 0 
10 5 Hello A! I'm sorry I fell back on my promise, haha. 
To be honest, I'm dead broke and I haven't eaten 
all day and I'm literally about to run out of gas in 
my car, and those extra five dollars are going to 
help me out with that!  ¶ If you choose out the 
most you are going to get is 5 more dollars, I can 
promise you that I'll agree to give you $10 if you 
choose in. Hopefully this works out! Either way, 
have a good one! 
88 YES 12 YES 12 
8 5 I only sent less than promised because I wanted to 
see what would happen 
14 YES 10 YES 10 
10 2 Hi, I was a little confused as to the experiment 
before. But I will stay true to this promise 
19 YES 9 YES 9 
13 9 lets split the money 10 and 10 7 YES 10 YES 10 
10 8 I apologize for cheating you out of your $2 - 
normally I'm not the kind of person to do that sort 
of thing. When two people aren't face-to-face they 
usually have more confidence to do things they 
wouldn't normally do. This time I promise I'll play 
fair. 
47 YES 9 YES 9 
10 7 I didn't know we were repeating this. This time I 
really will split 50/50 :) 
15 YES 10 YES 10 
11 2 I will transfer back 18 to you this time to make it 
fair ¶  so we will have the same amount. I promise 
this time. 
24 YES 18 YES 10 
14 11 Hi. I apologize for short changing you.  I should 
have been honsest and gone off the first example.  
I went off the third example w/my self interest in 
mind.  I'll keep my word this time. 
35 YES 18 YES 18 
11 10 10/10? 1 YES 12 YES 7 
8 0 sorry about last time i feel bad......50/50  this time? 10 YES 10 YES 0 
8 7 Strategy :) 1 YES 10 YES 10 
10 0 I feel bad that you now only have the option of 
going home with $5 so you should click in again 
and i will give you $12 so that you go home with 
more than just the basic amount possible 
40 YES 12 YES 0 
8 6 My sincerest appologies on that last one...I do feel 
quite guilty ¶  and I assure you that this time I shall 
keep my promise with utmost integrity.  You have 
34 YES 16 YES 1 
Schniter & Sheremeta   Predictable and Predictive Emotions 
 
                     55 
my word as an honest gentleman. 
10 7 I feel bad for promising 10 and giving you 7. If 
you choose in I'll send you 13 so that we'll come 
out even. 
24 YES 13 YES 13 
5 1 my bad... 2 YES 10 YES 8 
10 3 I'll transfer back more money this time ¶  actually 
$10 
9 YES 11 YES 10 
10 8 Hi ¶ I was testing if it really will let me decide how 
much I can get myself. This time I will give you 
the right amount I promised. 
28 YES 10 YES 10 
10 0   0 NO 20 YES 0 
10 0 This time I'll give you what I promise.  Sorry! 9 YES 10 NO  
10 0 ok for real this time haha. The first time was a joke 
lol 
13 YES 15 NO  
17 0 May God bless you 4 NO 13 NO  
10 7 In the previous exercise I wanted to see if one 
really could promise one amount and then give 
another. After seeing that it is possible, I promise 
to give you the amount I state. 
34 YES 10 NO  
17 1 i know that there is no reason you'd trust me 
because i didn't follow through with my promise 
last time ¶ but if you choose in i will transfer all of 
the money that i say i will. ¶ for real this time. 
41 YES 18 NO  
10 5 Even though I was decietful ¶ you were no worse 
off then had you picked OUT.  The other option 
would have still led you to $5. 
25 YES 5 NO  
12 5  0 NO 20 NO  
18 4  0 NO 12 NO  
7 6  0 NO 9 NO  
10 5  0 NO 8 NO  
10 7  0 NO 10 NO  
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Table D2: Distrusted Trustees Messages 
Promised  
Game 1 
Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
11 8 seems fair 3 8 YES 0 
16 lets go 50/50. i give you $10, i get $10. ¶ its almost christmas.... 13 10 YES 1 
9 I want to split the money right down the middle. I will give you ten dollars 
and I will get ten dollars.  If you choose out you will get less and both of us 
will come out empty handed. This is for the benefit of both parties and you 
will make more money in this way than you will by opting out. 
62 10 YES 1 
5 hey if i transfer 9 to you will you accept ? 11 9 YES 8 
10 Trust me this time. Please? 5 10 YES 7 
10 hi! i was actually going to give you the $10 that time! You would have made 
more money! I promise to give what I promise to you this time as well! 
31 8 YES 5 
11 Hello, ¶ I think $11.00 for you is a fair price for this survey and it is more than 
the $5.00 you get for choosing Out. I will keep my offer the same if you chose 
In. ¶ Thank you 
37 11 YES 12 
10 Hey! Okay, listen, I was genuinely going to give you ten dollars. I think it 
makes sense for both of us to make as much money as possible. I'm not trying 
to trick you. I'm just poor and want a few extra dollars to buy Christmas 
presents. So could you please just be in" next time? That way we can both 
make more. I promise I am not lying to you. I know it's anonymous but please 
trust me. :(" 
80 9 YES 10 
6 You click out,  you earn 5. You accept my offer,  you earn 6. It doesn't make 
any sense to click OUT. This is not a situation where my gain affects your 
profits in the future, this isn't one business earning a little bit and another 
earning a lot at its expense. You have to option of $6 or $5,  without 
repercussions or any damage in the future. Me getting 0 does you no good,  all 
it does is hurt you. If you want $5,  click OUT. But it obviously makes more 
sense to click IN. 
95 6 YES 7 
1 If I offer you at least 30% of my income we both make more than if you opt 
out. 
19 7 YES 7 
8 How about 10? We will both make the same amount evenly. 11 10 YES 10 
10 I am a person of my word. I will transfer back $10 so we both make the same 
amount of money and more money than if you pick OUT 
29 10 YES 10 
10 I will offer 10 dollars of my income to you. If you choose in, then you will 
recieve 10 dollars and i will recieve 10 dollars. If you choose out, you will 
only recieve 5 dollars. 
36 10 YES 10 
20 I will split it with you so we both get ten dollars. 12 10 YES 10 
6  0 9 YES 9 
6 Please trust me when I say I will give you the amount I will promise you. This 
way, we will both earn more money instead of you just earnint $5 and me 
earning nothing. Let's take all of their money together! 
41 7 YES 7 
5 I will transfer 10 dollars. 5 10 YES 10 
5 Hey ¶  to make this a win-win situation for both of us ¶  I'll transfer $10 and 
that way both of us will earn the same amount. It's really a good gameplan. :) 
31 0 YES 8 
7 Ok ¶  so this time let's make it actually fair.... I should have made it even last 
time. So this time if I give you back $8 ¶  you'll leave with $20 and I'll leave 
with $19. you still come out on top ¶  but I don't mind. And that's more than 
you'll make if you click OUT. I'm in the same boat as you....I too am poor as 
hell and would like to make some easy cash.... 
75 8 YES 8 
20 I will transfer you back 75% back. 7 10 YES 0 
5 We can figure out a way to divide the amount of the $20 equally if the result 
from that will have us leave here with more than $7 
28 10 YES 9 
10 I won't ask you to trust me.  That's your choice ¶  what I will say though is 
offer you $10 to each of us.  We both walk away from this evenly and both  
better off than we came in. 
38 10 YES 10 
4 I promise to transfer back 20 of my income to you. I really need this extra 
money. I hope you understand 
21 20 YES 0 
9 Let's be fair and split the pool evenly. Trust that I will not go back on what I 
say. 
19 10 YES 10 
6 I will give you half of the amount of the income 11 12 YES 0 
5 Hello A ¶ I'm stoked to be making money while my roomate snores away. 
Hahaha. ¶ Cha-ching ly ¶ B.¶ 
16 4 YES 4 
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20 if i say $20 and you accpet ¶ I promise to give you $20 back so we both leave 
with $20 ¶  the max amount 
23 20 YES 20 
8 I promise to uphold any deals set before me 9 10 YES 10 
6 I promise to give you $7 for clicking "in." I guarantee it. As I see it ¶  this 
gives you $2 more dollars than you would recieve by clicking "out." It's a 
win-win situation. 
33 7 YES 7 
8  0 10 YES 0 
5 I think you should choose IN because it is simple game theory. If you choose 
IN and I choose to give you $10 ¶  which I promise to give you ¶  then we 
both win.  I know that you would automatically want to choose OUT so that 
you can get $5 no matter what ¶  but I promise you that you will get $10. We 
both want to get money ¶  and this is a good way to share our earnings. I hope 
you choose IN! :) 
83 5 YES 0 
10 If I offered you 10$ why would you rather get 5? 11 10 YES 10 
6 Ouch. ): I'm not gonna scam you, dude. When I make a promise, I make a 
promise. We both make more money this way; it's good all around! 
28 6 NO  
5 hey Participant a make a deal dont do like this we should come here to earn 
money kul 
18 1 NO  
10 dont be an asshole 4 7 NO  
10 Trust me. 2 10 NO  
6 You'll get more than $5. 5 8 NO  
8 Hello there! So it's probably hard to trust me ¶  in that I will return your 
money? And I would quite frankly feel the same way. The thing is though that 
you don't know me but I know me and I know that when I make a promise I 
keep it. I hope you can trust in me. :) 
58 7 NO  
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Table D3: Promise-Keepers Messages 
Promised Returned Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted?
Game 2 
Returned
Game 2 
6 14 I paid out more than I promised to transfer back the first time as a 
reward for going IN 
19 10 YES 0 
6 6 merry christmas! 2 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same deal as before sounds about right, in my opinion. 10 10 YES 10 
8 8 i guess you need the money too so we should split it! 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hey there. Want to do the same thing again,  and both come out 
ahead? 
14 10 YES 10 
9 9 hey so 10 and 10 this time? 7 10 YES 10 
10 10 I will split it equally 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks for accepting my last offer. I promise to always uphold 
my side of the deal. 
16 10 YES 10 
9 9 hello A! :) 3 7 YES 7 
7 7 I won't lie to you. I know we're all broke college students here 
who need to make money. ugh 
19 8 YES 8 
10 10 This is tres bizarre. 4 10 YES 10 
5 5 i send you 10 and you hit in..that way we both get the same 
amount of money. =] 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's do the same thing,  that way we both get the max amount of 
money 
15 10 YES 0 
10 10 we'll go 50/50 on everything. i promise. 7 10 YES 10 
6 6 we're a good pair. i dont know what else to say haha. 12 6 YES 1 
11 11 expecto patronum! 2 11 YES 2 
10 10 Pleasure doing business with you :) 6 10 YES 10 
9 9 :) I dont know what to say haha but ill split it 50 50 this time for 
you 
18 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's make some MONEY :) click in on all of them and i'll try and 
make it as fair as possible. 
21 10 YES 10 
9 9 I hope you are satisfied with the amount of money I offered you.  
I will offer more this time. 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 I don't really have anything to say...let's split the money 10-10 
again 
13 10 YES 10 
10 10 $10 is better than $5. Trust me, I'm a doctor haha 11 10 YES 10 
6 6  0 6 YES 6 
7 7 I will do exactly the same thing as I did before. 11 7 YES 7 
10 10 Lets split it 11/ 9 everytime, that way we both get more money IN 
than OUT? sound good? I don't think you can answer me. . . 
27 9 YES 9 
6 6 Again I will promise $6. Please choose IN as it will maximize the 
profit that both of us can potentially made. I promise that I will 
send the full amount and if we can trust each other i will increase 
the amount I send in the following round. Thank you. 
50 6 YES 6 
10 10 Same as last time? It's only fair we earn the same amount. 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi. i think it's best when we split it! makes it fair for everyone 14 10 YES 10 
10 10 ill give u ten everytime if you choose IN then we both get ten 
dollars everytime we both go home with the same amount of 
money. again ten dollars a piece everytime go home with same 
amt. :) 
38 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
6 6 want to choose in and then we take half? 10 each? 11 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
10 10 Let's keep going 50/50 4 10 YES 10 
7 7 I promise to transfer you more money than last time. 10 9 YES 9 
9 9 Hi, hope you're content with the $9 7 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's split the 20 evenly, 10-10 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 Want to just split it again? 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing as before, we both might as well walk out with enough 
for gas money! 
16 10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing? 2 10 YES 10 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
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10 10 I will keep it equal like last time. 8 10 YES 10 
8 10  0 7 YES 9 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
8 8 Same as before Ill send you 8. We both get more $$ that way! 14 8 YES 0 
10 10 Same deal. 2 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 5 
10 10 i promise to do 50/50 again 6 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
8 8 hey, so i just want you to know that i'll probably sent you $8 or 
$9! nice working with you! 
20 8 YES 8 
10 10 I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us 
and it's fair :) ¶ Thanks for being great! 
24 10 YES 10 
10 10 I will be fair. 4 10 YES 10 
6 6 Hi A! :) 3 9 YES 6 
8 8 I'm going to do the same thing. 7 8 YES 9 
9 9 I hope you're having a great day! 7 8 YES 8 
9 9 Teamwork! 1 10 YES 10 
10 10 I promise not to screw you out of any money and to transfer back 
what I say I will. If you choose in¶ we'll both benefit more! =D¶ 
28 8 YES 8 
10 10 Don't worry, we'll evenly split the money this time, too, just like 
last time. I won't try to scam you or anything, because that's 
below me. You'll get the 10 dollars that I promise you. :) 
36 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm not a risk taker and I'm not a dick. I said I'd give back ten 
before, and I did. We both want money. You can make $5 or $10 
because I will give you ten again. yayyy money=)) 
39 10 YES 10 
10 10 If we do this again, i'm always going to keep it equal for both of 
us. 
16 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi, so I know it's hard to trust someone who you don't even know 
but I'll be I'll do my best to make things work. 
25 9 YES 9 
10 10 I figure we are both equally desperate for cash. 9 10 YES 10 
9 9 Hi Participant A ¶ I hope you trust me due to the previous round. 
I will take care of you and uphold to my promises, if you take 
care of me. Deal? Now lets do this and make some bank! ¶ ¶ 
Signed, ¶ Participant B 
41 10 YES 10 
8 8 I'm going to offer $8 again. Hopefully you choose IN. That way 
we can both make a profit. 
18 8 YES 8 
10 10 Have you ever done this before? 6 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing? Seems fair? ... 4 10 YES 10 
9 9 i promise i will give you what i say i will 11 10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks, glad we're both making a good amount of money! It's 
tough starting us off though! Wish you the best! 
20 10 YES 5 
10 10 Hello. Hope this doesn't sound creepy or anything. I think we 
should work together to get out of here with the same amount of 
money. I'm going to send over 10 again. :) 
33 10 YES 10 
10 10 I think each of us getting 10 dollars is fair. do you agree? 13 10 YES 10 
8 8 same as last time :) 5 8 YES 8 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
10 10 You can trust me :) 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 Keep it even again 4 10 YES 10 
10 10 i chose to give $10 dollars and gave you $10 in that last part. i 
hope we get paid 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm going to do the same thing as last time, 10 for you and 10 for 
me. We both would then walk away with 27 dollars :) 
27 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hope you like the wind.... 5 10 YES 10 
8 8 Were you happy with the outcome? 6 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey if you accept the $10 then we both make that everytime and 
thats the most mutually beneficial. 
18 10 YES 10 
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10 10 Same thing again. We both benefit. 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi! let's split the money 50/50 and each get 10 every time 12 10 YES 10 
7 7  0 7 YES 7 
10 10 Thanks for choosing IN :) hopefully if we do the same thing again 
we'll both make $20 each? thanks! 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello ¶  I wanted to make things 50/50. I don't really understand 
but that seemed fair to me at least 
19 10 YES 10 
7 7 I have no idea what to say here. This is a nice text box? 14 8 YES 1 
9 9 I believe example 1 seemed the fairest for the position i was 
given. I did not want to be unfair however it seemed necessary to 
try and make a profit. I chose the smallest profit option which 
gave us both money in the end. 
44 9 YES 9 
10 10 I'll give you $10 just like before if you say "IN." ¶ It's a win-win 
(I get $10 instead of $0 and you get $10 instead of $5 if you were 
to say "OUT." 
32 10 YES 10 
7 7 I need a nap... 4 11 YES 10 
10 10 Let's just do that same transfer again 7 10 YES 10 
8 8 =] 1 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hi there ¶  just trying to keep things equal and honest ¶ now let's 
get some solid earnings again! :) 
18 10 YES 10 
8 8 This is a haiku. ¶ I am glad you trusted me¶ This way we both 
win! 
13 8 YES 10 
7 7  0 8 YES 8 
9 9 Please remember that if you say OUT ¶  you only get $5. I 
PROMISE you that I will not give you under that if you say IN ¶  
I promise. 
28 7 YES 6 
10 10 You're in good hands. Win/win. 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 I want to keep this fair and even! 8 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm glad you trusted me and went with IN ¶  I'm gonna do the 
same thing again so hopefully you go with IN again :) 
24 9 YES 9 
10 10 hi. i liked how we did it the first time. hopefully u did too 14 10 YES 0 
10 10 I will send you 10 if you select IN ¶ 10 10 YES 10 
9 9 $6 is the minimum offer to accept...anything higher your making 
more $ just off genorosity 
15 10 YES 6 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 Good deal! I'll up the transfer a to make it a litte more fair 14 10 YES 0 
9 9 This time I'm going to promise 11 back to you ¶  and since you've 
seen I keep my promise ¶  when you click IN I will give you back 
11 so we both walk out of here with 20. I don't break promises. 
41 11 YES 11 
9 9 50/50 ¶  sound good? 3 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8 I'll give you exactly what I promise 7 10 YES 10 
6 7  0 10 YES 8 
10 10 just wanted to say hello :) have a nice day! 9 10 YES 10 
10 10 Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶  and do the same thing. 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi! I'm going to split the money evenly. Have a nice day! 12 10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's split it half and half ¶  ten dollars. 8 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello "A". Based on our last experiment we have established trust 
¶  so thanks for making that happen!  I will repeat the same steps 
as last time to ensure that we both get the same amount of money 
at our maximum level ¶  10$ each.it makes no sense to betray 
each other because we just come out of this thing with less money 
on both parts. Lets get rich!! 
67 10 YES 1 
10 10 im going to offer you 10 again ¶  take it and we can profti equally 14 10 YES 0 
9 9 Hey just to let you know ¶  I try my best to never lie in life and I 
include this experiment part of my life standard so I won't lie. 
29 6 YES 6 
10 10 Hey. same amount ¶  same money ¶  we both leave with 27 buck 
in our pocket. =] 
15 10 YES 10 
10 10 Teamwork + Honesty = $$$$¶ 3 8 YES 8 
7 7 I Hate Mondays¶                         -Garfield 4 17 YES 16 
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10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8 Hey! So I want to make money ¶  just as much as you do ¶  so 
why dont we call it even and I promise $10 ¶  you accept ¶  and 
we get out of here! =D Thanks 
34 10 YES 10 
10 10 Pay it forward. ¶ Have a great day. 7 10 YES 10 
7 7  0 7 YES 7 
10 10 Yay! great teamwork last time. I think we should do the same 
thing again this time. That way we both get the maximum amount 
of money. Hope that sounds good! :] 
31 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi hope your doing well. i plan on doing the same thing as before 14 10 YES 10 
10 10 50-50 :] 2 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing? 2 10 YES 0 
10 10 I think we should do $10 each again ¶  works out best for the both 
of us. 
16 10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's do the same...It worked and we both made some money!!!! 11 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey beautiful. I hopee your having a good day. Truthfully ¶  I'll 
get you more money if you say IN. 
19 10 YES 8 
9 9 well we worked together so far- want to do it again? at least we'll 
both make more than $5 
19 7 YES 7 
10 10  0 10 YES 0 
9 9 i will keep my promise! 5 9 YES 9 
10 10 trust me 2 20 YES 20 
7 7 I'm not quite sure what to say ¶  but hi!:) 9 10 YES 0 
9 9 lets do this! 3 10 YES 15 
9 9  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 same deal. 2 9 YES 9 
10 10  0 10 YES 8 
9 9  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm not entirely sure what I'm supposed to say ¶  BUT point is I 
promise I will not jip you out of money. What I promise is what 
you'll get and I hope you will not jip me out of any money either 
:) 
43 9 YES 9 
6 6  0 7 NO  
9 9  0 10 NO  
7 7 I'm planning on offering the same amount so we can potentially 
just do the same thing as before 
18 7 NO  
8 8 choose IN ¶  i will transfer you the promised amount of $ 11 9 NO 	
8 8  0 7 NO  
10 10 we need eachother to make money. 7 20 NO  
8 8 Hi 1 7 NO  
7 7  0 7 NO  
9 9  0 8 NO  
8 8 We the People of the United States of America, ¶ Inorder to form 
a more perfect Union, ¶ Do ordain and establish this constitution 
of the United States... 
24 8 NO  
10 10  0 5 NO  
6 6 I'll promise to transfer whatever amount I say 8 6 NO  
 
 
 
 
 
